By resorting to the vector space structure of finite games, skew-symmetric games (SSGs) are proposed and investigated as a natural subspace of finite games. First of all, for two player games, it is shown that the skew-symmetric games form an orthogonal complement of the symmetric games. Then for a general SSG its linear representation is given, which can be used to verify whether a finite game is skew-symmetric. Furthermore, some properties of SSGs are also obtained in the light of its vector subspace structure. Finally, a symmetry-based decomposition of finite games is proposed, which consists of three mutually orthogonal subspaces: symmetric subspace, skew-symmetric subspace and asymmetric subspace. An illustrative example is presented to demonstrate this decomposition.
Introduction
The vector space structure of finite games is firstly proposed by [3] . Then it has been merged as an isomorphism onto a finite Euclidean space [8] . As a result, the decomposition of the vector space of finite games becomes a natural and interesting topic. Since the potential game is theoretically important and practically useful, a decomposition based on potential games and harmonic games has been investigated [3, 8] . Symmetric game is another kind of interesting games [1] , which may provide useful properties for applications. Hence symmetry-based decomposition is another interesting topic. Decomposition may help to classify games and to reveal properties of each kind of finite games.
To provide a clear picture of the decompositions we first give a survey for the vector space structure of finite games. Assume j ∈ S i , i.e., j is the j-th strategy of player i. Instead of j, we denote this strategy by δ j ki , which is the j-th column of identity matrix I ki . This expression is called the vector form of strategies. Since each payoff function c i is a pseudo-logical function, there is a unique row vector V 
where ⋉ is the semi-tensor product of matrices which is defined in next section. The set of finite games G = (N, S, C) with |N | = n, |S i | = k i , i = 1, · · · , n, is denoted by G [n;k1,··· ,kn] . Now it is clear that a game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is uniquely determined by
The vector space structure of potential games has been clearly revealed in [7] by providing a basis of potential subspace. Using this result, [8] re-obtained the decomposition (3) with R nk standard inner product through a straightforward linear algebraic computation. The concept of symmetric game was firstly proposed by Nash [13] . It becomes an important topic since then [1, 2, 4] . We also refer to [10] for a vector space approach to symmetric games. The symmetry-based decompositions have been discussed recently as for four strategy matrix games [15] , as well as for general two-player games [16] .
In this paper, the skew-symmetric game is proposed. First, we show that two-player games have an orthogonal decomposition as in (4) . That is, the vector subspace of skew-symmetric games is the orthogonal complement of the subspace of symmetric games:
where [2;κ] and K [2;κ] are symmetric and skew-symmetric subspaces of G [2;κ] respectively. Furthermore, certain properties of skew-symmetric games are also revealed. The bases of symmetric and skew-symmetric games are constructed. Due to their orthogonality, following conclusions about the decomposition of finite games G [n,κ] are obtained:
(2) if n ≤ κ + 1, then
where E [n;κ] is the set of asymmetric games.
Finally, for statement ease, we give some notations:
1. M m×n : the set of m × n real matrices.
2. B m×n : the set of m × n Boolean matrices, (B n : the set of n dimensional Boolean vectors. 
For the sake of compactness, it is briefly denoted as
11. S n : n-th order symmetric group. 12. ·, · : the standard inner product in R n .
13. P n : n-th order Boolean orthogonal group.
14. GL(n, R) (or GL(V )): general linear group. 15. G [n;k1,··· ,kn] : the set of finite games with |N | = n,
17. S [n;κ] : the set of (ordinary) symmetric games. Denote by G S a symmetric game. 18. K [n;κ] : the set of skew-symmetric games. Denote by G K a skew-symmetric game. 19. E [n;κ] : the set of asymmetric games. Denote by G E an asymmetric game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, a brief review of semi-tensor product of matrices is given. After introducing a symmetry-based classification of finite games, Section 3 presents mainly two results: (1) the orthogonal decomposition of two player games; (2) the linear representation of skew-symmetric games. Some properties of skew-symmetric games are discussed in Section 4. A basis of K [n,κ] is also constructed. Section 5 is devoted to verifying the orthogonality of symmetric and skew-symmetric games. Section 6 provides a symmetry-based orthogonal decomposition of finite games. In Section 7, an illustrative example is given to demonstrate this decomposition. Section 8 is a brief conclusion.
Preliminaries

Semi-tensor Product of Matrices
In this section, we give a brief survey on semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices. It is the main tool for our approach. We refer to [5, 6] for details. The STP of matrices is defined as follows:
where t = lcm(n, p) is the least common multiple of n and p, and ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
STP is a generalization of conventional matrix product, and all computational properties of the conventional matrix product remain available. It has been successfully used for studying logical (control) systems [12, 18] . Throughout this paper, the default matrix product is STP. Hence, the product of two arbitrary matrices is well defined, and the symbol ⋉ is mostly omitted.
First, we give some basic properties of STP, which will be used in the sequel.
2. (Distributive Law:)
Proposition 4. Let X ∈ R t be a t dimensional column vector, and M a matrix.
Then
The basic function of a swap matrix is to swap two vectors.
Proposition 6. Let X ∈ R m and Y ∈ R n be two column vectors. Then
The swap matrix is an orthogonal matrix:
is an orthogonal matrix. Precisely,
Given a matrix A = (a i,j ) ∈ M m×n , its row stacking form is
its column stacking form is
Using Propositions 6 and 7 yields
and
Next, we consider the matrix expression of logical relations. Identifying
then a logical variable x ∈ D can be expressed in vector form as
which is called the vector form expression of x. A mapping f : D n → R is called a pseudo-Boolean function.
Proposition 9. Given a pseudo-Boolean function f : D n → R, there exists a unique row vector V f ∈ R 2 n , called the structure vector of f , such that (in vector form)
Remark 10. In previous proposition, if D is replaced by D κ , κ > 2, then the function f is called a pseudo-logical function and the expression (17) remains available with an obvious modification that x i ∈ ∆ κ and V f ∈ R κ n .
Definition 11. Let A ∈ M p×n and B ∈ M q×n . Then the Khatri-Rao product of A and B, denoted by A * B, is defined as follows:
Proposition 12. Assume
where
Symmetric and Skew-symmetric Games
Classification of Finite Games
This subsection considers the symmetry-based classification of finite games. First, we give a rigorous definition for symmetric and skew-symmetric games.
1. If for any σ ∈ S n , we have
the set of symmetric games in G [n;κ] .
2.
If for any σ ∈ S n , we have
where i = 1, · · · , n, then G is called a skew-symmetric game. Denote by
It is well known that G [n;κ] ∼ R nκ n is a vector space [3, 8] . It is easy to figure out that both S [n;κ] and K [n;κ] are subspaces of G [n;κ] . Hence, they are also two subspaces of R nκ n .
Then, we can define the following asymmetric subspace.
Definition 14. G is called an asymmetric game if its structure vector
The set of asymmetric games is denoted by E [n;κ] , which is also a subspace of
Example 15. Consider G ∈ G [3;2] . A straightforward computation shows the following result:
, then its payoff functions are as in Table 1 , where
, then its payoff functions are as in Table 2 , where
, then its payoff functions are as in Table 3 , where
Moreover, it is ready to verify the orthogonality:
We conclude that
, which verifies (6). 
Two Player Games
In this subsection we consider G ∈ G [2;κ] . Let A and B be the payoff matrices of player 1 and player 2 respectively. According to Definition 13, it is easy to verify the following fact:
1. G is a symmetric game, if and only if,
G is a skew-symmetric game, if and only if,
Note that for G ∈ G [2;κ] , we have its structure vector as
where V R (A(B)) is the row stacking form of matrix A(B). According to Propositions 7 and 8, we have the following result:
Lemma 17.
G is a symmetric game, if and only if,
2. G is a skew-symmetric game, if and only if,
According to Lemma 17, the following result can be obtained via a straightforward computation.
Theorem 18. Let G ∈ G [2;κ] . Then G can be orthogonally decomposed to
Proof. Denote the structure vector of G as
. We construct a symmetric game G S by setting
and a skew-symmetric game G K by
Then, it is ready to verify that
The conclusion follows. ✷ Note that Theorem 18 implies the decomposition (4).
(1) G is symmetric, if and only if, its payoff functions are as in Table 4. (2) G is skew-symmetric, if and only if, its payoff functions are as in Table 5 .
(3) Let G ∈ G [2;2] with its payoff bi-matrix as in Table 6 .
Then it has an orthogonal decomposition into G S and G K with their payoff bi-matrices as in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively with 
Skew-Symmetric Game and Its Linear Representation
First, we present a necessary condition for verifying skew-symmetric games.
Proof. Consider σ = (1, i). According to Definition 13, we have
That is,
where s = 1, · · · , κ; i = 3, · · · , n.
Proof. Assume σ ∈ S n satisfies σ(1) = 1. Let σ = (2, i), i > 2. Then, we have
Since x 2 · · · x n ∈ ∆ κ n−1 are arbitrary, we have
✷ Note that the symmetric group S n is generalized by transpositions {(1, i)} [10] . That is,
This fact motivates the following result.
Theorem 22. Consider G ∈ G [n;κ] .
(1) If n = 2, then (24) is the necessary and sufficient condition for G ∈ K [2;κ] .
(2) If n > 2, then (24) and (25) are necessary and sufficient conditions for
Proof. We need only to prove the sufficiency.
(1) if n = 2, (22) implies the sufficiency.
(2) if n > 2, we divide our proof into two steps.
First, we prove the condition for a single payoff function c i . For any σ ∈ S n and σ(1) = 1, without loss of generality, we assume
From (25), it can be calculated that
. . .
Applying (24) to (26), we have
(27) (27) implies that for any σ ∈ S n and σ(i) = i, we have
Obviously, according to (19), (28) is the necessary and sufficient condition for a single payoff function to obey in a skew-symmetric game. Next, we consider the condition for cross payoffs. For any σ ∈ S n , without loss of generality, we assume
where σ j = (1, i j ), j = 1, 2, · · · , t.
Combining (24) with (25) yields
Clearly, (19) follows from (28) and (29). ✷ Remark 23. When n = 2 (24) degenerated
which coincides with (22).
Example 24. Consider G ∈ K [3;3] . From Proposition 21 we have
One can easily figure out that
where a i , b i , c i , i = 1, 2, 3, are real numbers. According to Proposition 20, we can calculate that
According to Definition 13, a straightforward verification shows that G ∈ K [3;3] .
As a byproduct, we have dim(K [3;3] ) = 9.
In the following, we consider the linear representation of S n in G [n;κ] .
Definition 25. [14] Let A be a group and V a finite dimensional vector space.
A linear representation of A in V is a group homomorphism ϕ : A → GL(V ).
Consider a profile s = (i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i n ) of a G ∈ G [n;κ] . We define two expressions of s as follows:
• STP Form: The STP form of s is expressed as
• Stacking Form: The strategy stacking form of s is expressed as
, where
It is easy to verify that the Φ can convert a profile from its STP form to its strategy stacking form. Precisely, we have s = Φs.
(31)
Remark 26. In the pseudo-logical function expression of payoffs (1), the profiles are expressed in its STP form, while in Definition 13 to permute the strategies the stacking form of s is convenient. That is why the above conversion is necessary.
Using above notations and Definition 13, the following result can be obtained easily.
Proposition 27. A game G ∈ G [n;κ] is skew-symmetric, if and only if,
, and * is the Khatri-Rao product.
We need the matrix expression of a σ ∈ S n , denoted by P σ . It is defined as
Consequently, we have
The next property follows immediately from the construction.
Proposition 28. Let σ ∈ S n . Then σ(i) = j, if and only if,
Using Propositions 27 and 28, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 29. G ∈ G [n;κ] is skew-symmetric, if and only if,
Proof. (Necessity) From (32) we have 
Then, ψ is a linear representation of S n in G [n;κ] .
Proof. We need only to show that ψ is a group homomorphism, that is
First, we verify that
Denote
Clearly, there is a one-one correspondence between P n and S n . Furthermore, from (33) we can calculate that
Next, we prove that
Define
According to Proposition 12 and (31) we have
Using (36), (37) and (38), a straightforward computation shows that
The proof is completed. ✷ Theorem 29 and Proposition 30 lead to the following result.
Corollary 31. G ∈ G [n;κ] is skew-symmetric, if and only if, it is invariant with respect to the linear representation ψ(σ), ∀ σ ∈ S n .
Some Properties of K [n,κ]
In this section, we mainly discuss some properties of K [n,κ] via its structure vector, which reveal the inside structure of skew-symmetric games. Particularly, they will be used in the sequel for investigating the decomposition of finite games.
Existence of K [n,κ]
The following proposition shows that when n > κ + 1 the K [n,κ] does not exit.
Proof. Assume n > κ+1. It is easy to know that for each x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ S, there exists at least two strategies x i , x j (i > 1 and j > 1), satisfying
Let σ = (i, j). Applying (40) to (19), we have
Using (24), we have
The conclusion follows. ✷ Next, we consider the marginal case when n = κ + 1.
Proof. Since n = κ + 1, for any x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ S, there exists at least two strategies x i , x j satisfying x i = x j . Let σ = (i, j). From (19) it is easy to verify that
In this subsection we construct a basis for K [n;κ] . According to Proposition 32, we only need to consider the case when n ≤ κ + 1. Otherwise, K [n;κ] = {0}.
Moreover, according to Proposition 20, to get a basis of K [n;κ] , it is enough to find a basis for V c 1 .
Algorithm 1: Define
It is easy to see |O| = ℓ, where
Define a relation ≺ on the set O as follows:
if and only if, there exists 0 < j ≤ n − 2, such that
One sees easily that the relation ≺ is a strict order which makes O a well ordered set as
, we define a set
According to the definition of skew-symmetry and the above construction, the following facts are either obvious or easily verifiable.
O i , then for any x 1 ∈ S 1 , c 1 (x 1 , z) = 0, because at least two components of z are the same.
Fact 2:
Fact 3:
Now, it is clear that to construct the basis for V c 1 , we need only to construct a "dual basis" for each O i . Note that x 1 ∈ S 1 is free, then we can define
Summarizing the above construction and argument yields the following results.
where η i j , j = 1, · · · , κ, i = 1, · · · , ℓ, are defined in (46). Then, there exists a row vector v ∈ R κℓ , such that
Lemma 35.
where 
Recall Examples 15 and 24, where the dimensions of K [3;2] and K [3;3] have been proved to be 2 and 9 respectively. Both two dimensions verify the formula (49).
Proposition 38. Define
Then we have
Proof. Denote
From Theorem 36 we know
According to Proposition 7, it is easy to calculate that 
where p := n+κ−2 n−1
Theorem 40.
[9] G ∈ G [n;κ] is a symmetric game, if and only if,
For symmetric games, similar to Algorithm 1, we give an algorithm to construct a basis for V c 1 . Algorithm 2: Define
Applying the relation ≺ defined in (43) to Q, it also makes Q a well ordered set as
where q i is the number of different z i σ in Q i . Denote the number of j in z i as
Moreover, they also satisfy that
Summarizing the above construction and the argument, we can obtain the following lemmas.
Lemma 41. Consider G ∈ S [n;κ] . Define
Lemma 42.
According to Lemmas 41, 42, and Theorem 40, we have the following result:
The basis of S [n;κ] is Row(E), where
In fact, the location of nonzero elements, i.e., "1" and "-1," in η Proposition 46.
1. if n > κ + 1, then
2. if n ≤ κ + 1, then
Decomposition of a Finite Game
Given G ∈ G [n;κ] , we would like to decompose it into three subgames: G S ∈ S [n;κ] , G K ∈ K [n;κ] and G E ∈ E [n;κ] . Precisely, we want to decompose the structure vector of G, that is V G , into three parts as
where V S G , V K G , and V E G are the structure vectors of G S , G K , and G E respectively. Now set
where X 1 ∈ R β , X 2 ∈ R α (when n > κ + 1 we have β = 0).
Then we have the following decomposition:
Proposition 47. Assume G ∈ G [n;κ] with its structure vector V G . Then
and X i , i = 1, 2, are defined in (68), Q is defined in (59).
Proof. From Theorem 36 and Theorem 43 we have
Putting (70) The corresponding payoff matrices are in Table 7 - Table 9 respectively.
Comparing Tables 7, 8 with Example 15, it is obvious that G S is symmetric and G K is skew-symmetric. 
Conclusion
Skew-symmetric games are proposed and studied in this paper. First, for two player games, it is proved that the vector subspace of SSGs is the orthogonal complement of the subspace of symmetric games. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition is obtained to verify whether a finite game is skewsymmetric. Moreover, its linear representation is constructed to provide a convenient method for the verification. Third, two properties of K [n;κ] are obtained. One is the existence of K [n;κ] . It is shown that: (i) if n > κ+1, then K [n;κ] = {0}; (ii) if n = κ + 1, then G ∈ K [n;κ] is a zero-sum game. In addition, a basis of K [n;κ] is constructed, which plays an important role in the decomposition of finite games. Then a basis of S [n;κ] is also given and the orthogonality of K [n;κ] with S [n;κ] is proved. Finally, the orthogonal decomposition of a finite game into symmetric, skew-symmetric and asymmetric subspaces is investigated. A decomposition formula is given and an illustrative example is presented.
